Voter Turnout under Voluntary Voting
In response to a report that 88 per cent of Australians would vote if voluntary, Sena tor Nick Minchin, the liberal Party's main advocate of voluntary voting, stated that he was delighted 'that such an overwhelming majority of Australians would freely choose to exercise dieir right to vote widiout being forced to do so by law. Nothing could better demonstrate how unnecessary compulsory voting is...' (quoted in Jackman, 1997:1) . The assumption is that a higher turnout is preferable to a lower turnout.
If compulsory voting were abolished in Australia, it is generally agreed that turnout would drop. But by how much? Would it be nearer die 59.2 per cent turnout of eligible voters in die 1922 Commonwealth elecdon diat sparked the legis lative introduction of compulsion in die first place, or die 88.3 per cent voluntary turnout in New Zealand in 1996 (Mackerras & Smiley, 1997:632) ?
The voluntary postal ballot for die 1998 Constitutional Convention in Australia recorded a turnout of just under 47 per cent. This figure is probably lower tiian it would be for a Commonwealth parliamentary election, which voters may take more seriously, although die requirement diat voters attend a polling boodi in order to cast a ballot is more time-consuming and may dissuade even more potential voters under a voluntary vote dian die postal version. Nevertheless, die experiment sug gests diat a substantially lower turnout could be expected under a voluntary ballot. Jackman (1997:42) estimates, based on non-response and estimation of measure ment errors of Australian survey data, that widi die abolition of compulsion 'substantially lower rates of voluntary turnout would eventuate, perhaps as low as diose countries like Japan or die US, in die 50 per cent to 60 per cent range'.
A change of voting law in Austria lor its 1986 federal election fortuitously made possible a comparison of turnout in die Austrian province of Carindiia, which in troduced mandatory voting for die election, and in surrounding provinces which remained voluntary. Widi a turnout of 92 per cent before die change to the law, Carindiia was already an highly participatory electorate. Even so, die rate jumped by 2.2 percentage points, and by 5 per cent relative to odier provinces (Hirczy, 1994:74) . This study suggests diat die abolition of compulsion, in die first instance at least, would lead to a fall in turnout even where diere was a political culture of high turnout.
Turnout and Bias
In what ways, if at all, is democracy harmed by a low turnout?
Compulsion and information. It is a reasonable assumption diat any loss of infor mation is detrimental to democracy. Democracy reflects die information that citi zens have about politics, sufficient at least to allow diem to vote, whedier in dieir own self-interest or for die common good. But, as Lau and Redlawsk (1997:585) remind us, only a tiny minority of citizens live up to die ideal of participation that democratic theorists like J.-J. Rousseau and J. S. Mill recommended. Other com-mentators argue that political indifference is a good tiling, since it promotes stability by dampening the impact of the ideologues. Presumably this means that the igno rant and the indifferent have to express those 'views' by voting, and that to this end it can be held that 'compulsory voting affects political culture in a conservative way' (Parish, 1992:18) .
In a study of voters in the US, where voting is voluntary, I.au and Redlawsk (1997:586) found that a surprisingly high 75 per cent of voters voted 'correctly', in the sense that the votes they cast were 'the same as the choice which would have been made under conditions of full information'. Would the percentage of 'incorrect' votes be even higher under compulsion? The study cannot tell us, but it does suggest a probable loss of 'correct' votes among those who do not vote: that is, a loss of valuable information from the democratic process.
Partisan bias. Mackerras and McAllister (1996) suggest that compulsory voting has a built-in bias against right-wing parties and in favour of left-wing and minor parties. In Australia, support for compulsion by the ALP, the Australian Democrats and the Greens suggests that this is indeed the case. But this is surely just the obverse of the bias against left-wing pardes that would follow an abolidon of compulsion. McAllis ter (1986:92) has esdmated that, if turnout fell to 1922 proportions, Labor would lose nearly 4 per cent and the liberals would gain 2 per cent on the 1977 elecdon result. For the 1996 result, Jackman (1997:40) concludes Uiat, 'as turnout dimin ished, die liberals' share of die vote could be as much as 7.4 percentage points higher dian the ALP's'.
The vote dial die ALP receives as a result of compulsion could be viewed as an error diat voluntary vodng would avoid. But it should more accurately be viewed as valid opinion diat would odierwise go unmeasured. Only die complete populadon supplies die accurate picture of die electorate's view; any move diat would lower die turnout would almost certainly provide a biased sample of die voters' wishes. A return to voluntary vodng thus risks a loss of collecdve judgment.
Does Compulsion Impair the Vote?
One measure of impairment associated widi compulsory vodng is die level of in formal voting, which in Australia is high by internadonal standards. However, it is generally accepted diat diis is die result of die interacdon between compulsory vot ing, die complexides of die electoral system like preferendal vodng and differences in die vodng rules for different elecdons, and die presence of a large number of non-English speaking migrants (McAllister, 1993:23) . At die 1996 Commonwealth election, 3 per cent of die votes cast were informal; compulsory vodng may account for a part of diat figure, but even if it accounted for all of it, it hardly compares widi a potential (and arguable) 30 per cent impairment to die vote under voluntary vot ing, if diat proportion chose not to vote.
There are at least two important dieoredcal considerations. Shapiro (1990:112) desires to achieve a 'dioroughgoing pluralism of dispersed preferences'. Democ racy as majority rule was originally an 'oppositional' ideal, an instrument for oppos-ing the elite. In the Australian context, that elite could arguably be defined as an intelligentsia that exercises an undue influence on democratic politics. Such a ten dency would be enhanced if less articulate citizens failed to vote. Democracy as an oppositional mechanism should be at its most powerful when the greatest number of potential non-voters vote, that is, when the dispersal of preferences is at its great est. Brennan and Lomasky (1993:225) advance a principle of 'responsible civic conduct' that could be interpreted as favouring compulsion. Their arguments op posing die secret ballot are also relevant. They claim that die secret ballot inhibits a culture of open discussion and leads to a monopoly of discussion by pardes and journalists; only an open ballot can filter out and-social vodng modves like flippancy or meanness. They imply diat die suffrage should be restricted to diose who 'have on hand an array of publicly acceptable reasons to jusdfy one's acdons' (Brennan & Lomasky, 1993:219) . But if only such people voted, die likely loss o f 'correct' votes would be high. As well, it is often die least ardculate who arc prone not to vote (McAllister 1986:91) , but dieir contribudon as an opposidonal force can provide for a more thoroughgoing pluralism and in diat sense encourages responsible civil con duct.
rfhe one element of compulsion diat does bear repeal is die exhausdve preferendal ballot, which in effect forces voters to make a choice between die major par des. Rydon (1997:177) has suggested dial die low turnout at die 1922 elecdon may have been caused by a change from first-past-the-post to preferendal vodng, which some voters found difficult or objected to. In a sense, complexity begat compul sion. The proponents of the repeal of compulsion, however, have no intendon of ditching die exhausdve preferendal vote (dierc was no dissent on the issue in die Joint Standing Committee Report).
Preferendal vodng is a reasonable system, ensuring diat die least number of votes are wasted (Taylor & Johnston, 1979:50) . However, in 1996 Albert lin g er drew attendon to die fact diat it was possible to cast a formal vote diat avoided a choice between die major pardes, since, under s.270 of die Commonwealth Elec toral Act, a vote is formal even when a preference number is repeated and a box left unfilled. Yet lin g e r was gaoled because he committed die offence of advocating vodng in a way diat did not accord widi die instructions on die ballot paper. This drives compulsion to the extreme, and increases die risk of an 'incorrect' vote being cast (one not reflecting die voter's opinion). There is a vast distinction between a system of compulsory vodng where voters are required only to deposit a ballot in die box, and one where dicy are compelled to allocate preferences to all candidates. As Twomey (1996:201) has argued, where voters are compelled to express a prefer ence for certain candidates diey do not wish to, dicy are in effect being forced to lie.
The Joint Standing Committee recommended closing die 'Langer loophole', but only because it exploited a contradiction in die vodng instructions in die Act, It could be as forcefully argued dial die secret ballot protects die voters from interference in casting dieir votes: which is, o f course, why it was introduced. which allowed for more than one method o f casting a formal vote. If the recom mendation for the repeal of compulsory voting had been accompanied by a rec ommendation for substituting compulsory exhaustive preferential voting widi op tional preferential voting, it might have been more credible. As it is, it looks like an exercise in partisan politics.
